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  1Abstract 
 
While the average change in house prices is related to changes in fundamentals or 
perhaps market-wide bubbles, not all houses in a market appreciate at the same rate. 
The primary focus of our study is to investigate the reasons for these variations in price 
changes among houses within a market. We draw on two theories for guidance, one 
related to the optimal search strategy for sellers of atypical dwellings and the other 
focusing on the bargaining process between a seller and potential buyers. We 
hypothesize that houses will appreciate at different rates depending on the 
characteristics of the property and the change in the strength of the housing market. 
These hypotheses are supported using data from three New Zealand housing markets. 
  2Introduction  
  Changes in the price of owner-occupied housing have multiple impacts on 
homeowners. House price changes affect many households’ wealth holdings because 
home equity comprises a large percentage of household wealth (Aizcorbe, Kennickell, 
and Moore 2003; Le Blanc and Lagarenne 2004). Variations in residential property 
prices also affect the risk level of a homeowner’s portfolio (Englund, Hwang, and Quigley 
2002; Flavin and Yamashita 2002; Sinai and Souleles 2005). 
  House price appreciation can be tapped through the use of home equity loans 
and second mortgages. In this way, home equity can be used to pay down other debts 
or be used to increase current consumption (Case, Quigley and Shiller 2005; Benjamin, 
Chinloy, and Jud 2004; Haurin and Rosenthal 2005). House price depreciation has been 
hypothesized to reduce geographic mobility because the loss of wealth by the resident 
makes it difficult to make a down payment on another home. In contrast, house price 
appreciation makes trading up in the housing market easier, likely increasing turnover 
rates in the residential market (Stein 1995, Lamont and Stein 1999, Genesove and 
Mayer 1997).  
  While the average change in house prices is related to changes in 
“fundamentals” such as national and local macroeconomic variables, or perhaps market-
wide bubbles (Abraham and Hendershott 1996; Bourassa, Hendershott, and Murphy 
2001), not all houses in a market appreciate at the same rate. The primary focus of our 
study is to investigate the reasons for these variations in price changes among houses 
within a market. We draw on two theories for guidance, both related to the search 
process for housing. One theory is related to sellers’ optimal search strategy for atypical 
dwellings. The other theory concerns the bargaining process between a seller and 
potential buyer. Our major theoretical innovation is to consider the implications of these 
theories in a multiperiod multi-sale framework. We hypothesize that houses will 
  3appreciate at different rates depending on the characteristics of the property and the 
change in the strength of the housing market.  
  We use repeat sales data from three New Zealand metropolitan areas to test the 
model. The standard deviations of the variation of house specific appreciation rates from 
their local market average are 0.23 (Auckland), 0.17 (Wellington), and 0.15 
(Christchurch). For example, the median real house price in our Auckland repeat sales 
sample changed from $140,000 in 1989 to about $200,000 in 1996.  A one standard 
deviation changes in price from the market-wide increase yield a wide range of real 
house prices for 1996: $168,000 to $232,000 (the variation is 23 percent of the initial 
price of $140,000). The empirical tests reveal substantial support for the hypotheses that 
houses appreciate and depreciate at rates that vary from the market average because of 
variations in their atypicality and in their attributes that are related to bargaining. This 
support occurs in three separate markets that had quite different experiences in rates of 
house price appreciation. 
  Our review of the literature highlights research that documents differential rates 
of house price appreciation in the housing market. We also describe prior research on 
two variants of search models where the focus was on house price determination. Next, 
we present formal models of these search processes, but emphasize the impact of 
variation in the strength of the housing market on price outcomes. Descriptions of the 
data and results follow. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings 
for urban areas and investments in housing. 
Literature 
  The return and risk characteristics of housing ownership are important for 
household portfolio decisions. Analyses of these decisions have focused on market-wide 
measures of returns and risks. However, the risk of investing in housing depends on 
price movements in individual houses, not the market, and thus investigation of these 
  4price movements is needed. Case and Shiller (1989) is one of the few studies that 
compare individual house price movements to those of a market. They find that market-
wide variation explains little of specific houses’ price movements and thus housing risk is 
not well measured by market measures of risk. 
  The spatial uniformity of house price appreciation has been debated in the 
literature with some arguing that, while rates of appreciation vary across space, they do 
not vary systematically across household income levels, race, or housing quality 
(Pollakowski, Stegman, and Rohe 1991). Others argue that there are significant 
differences in housing appreciation rates by race and income (Poterba 1991; Kim 
2000).
1 Belsky and Duda (2002) find in a sample of four U.S. MSAs that the rate of 
appreciation of the lowest quality tier of owner-occupied housing is greater than average, 
but the standard deviation is 2.5 times higher. They also find there are many cases of 
properties selling for an inflation adjusted loss if transaction costs are accounted for; the 
range in the cities being from 40 to 56 percent. However, they do not explain why 
houses vary in their rate of appreciation. Mayer (1993) studies several cities and 
concludes that high value homes appreciate faster on average, but they also are more 
volatile. Clapp and Giaccotto (1998) find that the evolution of prices for large and small 
houses differs. Gill and Haurin (1991) report evidence that variations in house prices 
within coastal California markets are related to the distance from the sea coast, due to 
legislation that restricted coastal residential construction. Archer, Gatzlaff, and Ling 
(1996) find that house price appreciation is weakly related to a property’s distance from 
the central business district. Coulson and Lahr (2005) report that the value of properties 
in neighborhoods zoned as historical rose by 14 to 23 percent more than that of 
properties in otherwise similar neighborhoods in Memphis TN. 
  Multiple studies have found that the relationship between a home’s original value 
and the rate of appreciation varies over time according to the prevailing economic 
  5climate (Li and Rosenblatt 1997; Smith and Tesarek 1991; Seward, Delaney, and Smith 
1992). Both Smith and Tesarek (1991) and Seward, Delaney, and Smith (1992) study 
single cities and find that high price homes appreciate faster during boom times. They 
differ in whether there is a relationship between prices and house quality during 
recessions. Smith and Ho (1996) find that lower-price houses are more likely to 
appreciate as interest rates fall and income and employment rise.  
  In general, the literature is silent about the expected relationship of a house’s 
price appreciation and its characteristics. The one exception is a descriptive study by 
Jud, Roulac, and Winkler (2005) who use data from Greensboro NC and Houston TX. 
They regress individual property returns on the national rate of return for housing and a 
vector of property characteristics. While most of house characteristics have significant 
coefficients in the regressions, they differ in signs comparing the two areas. In contrast, 
we develop a theoretical model that generates specific hypotheses about the way in 
which house characteristics affect house price appreciation.  
  Two theories about the search process for housing predict a relationship 
between house price levels and the characteristics of a house. One theory begins with 
the assumption that atypical residential properties generate a relatively large variance of 
offer prices from potential buyers compared with standard properties. Search theory 
predicts that sellers of atypical properties will wait relatively long for a high valued draw 
from the distribution of potential buyers’ offers and thus should, on average, take longer 
to sell (Haurin 1988). Another prediction of the model is that the ratio of the expected 
sales price to the mean of the offer distribution will be relatively high for atypical 
properties. A number of subsequent studies have considered the effect of atypicality on 
house price or the length of time to sale, but no research has considered the impact of 
atypicality on the rate of house price appreciation, which is the focus of our study. 
Capozza, Israelsen, and Thomson (2005) use a sample of manufactured homes to study 
  6the factors that explain the difference between the original transaction price of a unit and 
the post-default recovery price. They find that increased atypicality raises the original 
price as predicted by search theory, but it reduces the recovery price. 
  A second aspect of search theory related to house characteristics and the 
observed transaction price is bargaining theory. Empirical studies consistently find that 
the negotiation process between buyers and sellers influences the final transaction price. 
Sellers that are highly motivated to sell, which would occur if for example they have 
purchased another house, tend to sell for a relatively low price compared to the 
expected value (Glower, Haurin, and Hendershott 1998). Harding, Rosenthal, and 
Sirmans (HRS, 2003) argue that differences in bargaining power between seller and 
buyer affect transaction prices multiplicatively and they find supportive evidence using 
data from the American Housing Survey.
2 In an extension of the HRS model, Harding, 
Knight, and Sirmans (2003) argue that the negotiation process also may affect the 
implicit prices of housing characteristics. They test their model using the hedonic price 
framework (Rosen 1974) and find support for the hypothesis that bargaining affects both 
house characteristics’ implicit prices and the constant in the hedonic estimation.
3 
However, there are no studies that consider the effect of bargaining or atypicality on the 
prices observed when a house sells repeatedly. 
  We develop a model of the repeated sale of residential single-family properties 
and investigate the impact of a house’s characteristics on the rate of appreciation. The 
model allows for price to be affected by both atypicality and bargaining. It suggests that if 
the economic environment is the same at the time of both sales, then there will be no 
systematic effects of house characteristics on the rate of appreciation. However, if the 
economic environment worsens, then the rate of house price appreciation will be 
relatively lower for atypical properties.
4 Further, a changing economic environment 
  7affects the relative bargaining power of sellers and buyers and could interact with 
particular house characteristics. 
  
Model 
The Impact of Bargaining on Repeat Sales  
  The standard hedonic house price model in linear form relates the i-th house’s 
price (P) at time t to house characteristics (X): 
(1) Pit =  αt + Xitβt
where the constant and coefficients of the house’s characteristics may vary over time. 
HRS argue that a particular house’s observed price also is a function of the outcome of 
buyer and seller bargaining. The financial outcome of bargaining depends on buyer and 
seller characteristics. However, we note that the bargaining outcome also should depend 
on the overall strength of the housing market at the time of sale. For example, sellers 
with low motivation to sell should have relatively high bargaining power, but this 
bargaining power should be larger when the demand for houses is high. In a weak 
market, these sellers’ bargaining power should be attenuated because of the lack of 
potential buyers.  
  Inclusion of bargaining in the model results in: 
(2)   Pit =  αt + Xitβt + θBBi(Mt) 
where Bi(Mt) represents the effect of bargaining on house price when the strength of the 
housing market is Mt. Following HKS, we further assume that the impact of bargaining is 
reflected in both the implicit prices of a house’s characteristics and a factor that 
additively shifts the hedonic price equation (σ): 
(3) Bi(Mt) = σMt + (Xitδ)Mt. 
In (3), both the bargaining shift factor and the slope factor depend on the strength of the 
house market at that time. Substituting (3) into (2) yields: 
  8(4) Pit =  αt + Xit βt + θ(σMt + (Xitδ)Mt). 
  Next, consider multiple sales of a single property. Differences in bargaining 
outcomes depend on changes in the strength of the housing market. Differencing (3) and 
comparing sales at time t and T yields: 
(5)  ∆BBi = σ∆MtT + (Xiδ)∆MtT. 
where we assume that property characteristics are unchanged.
5 The result of comparing 
sales prices is: 
(6)   ∆PitT = ∆αtT + Xi ∆βtT + θ(σ∆MtT + (Xiδ)∆MtT). 
A house’s price change depends on changes in the strength of the housing market that 
affect bargaining outcomes, market-wide changes in the valuation of house 
characteristics, and the change in the intercept, which likely reflect house price inflation. 
  To highlight the impact of bargaining, we subtract market-wide changes in price 
from the idiosyncratic price change for a particular property. Market-wide changes are 
the result of three components: ∆αtT, ∆βtT, and σ∆MtT.
6 The result is ∆Pi
* where: 
(7)  ∆Pi
* = (Xiδ’)∆MtT. 
In the empirical work, one of the hypotheses we test is whether price changes that 
deviate from the market average are related to changes in the interaction of the strength 
of the housing market and a house’s characteristics. 
The Impact of Atypicality on Repeat Sales 
  Optimal stopping theory (DeGroot 1970, McCall 1970) argues that sellers 
searching for a buyer set a reservation price and accept the first offer that meets or 
exceeds it. The reservation price depends on the characteristics of the item being sold 
and the distribution of expected offers. Haurin (1988) applied this theory to housing and 
argues that the distribution of potential offers for a house differs not only in mean but 
also in variance. He proved that sellers facing a larger variance of offer prices, holding 
the mean constant, will set a higher reservation price in the search process. Empirically, 
  9a greater variance of offers is likely for properties with unusual characteristics; that is, 
atypical properties. The expected impact of owning an atypical property is that the 
waiting time for a successful bid should be longer, and the sales price (relative to the 
mean of the offer distribution) should be larger. 
  Intuition suggests that if an atypical property sells twice under identical economic 
conditions, then its price appreciation will tend to match that of the market. However, 
similar to the analysis of bargaining, if the economic conditions change over time, then a 
property’s rate of appreciation should be related to its degree of atypicality. In the 
Appendix we derive the reservation and expected sales prices for a property, the values 
accounting for the cost of selling and the variance of offers. For the case of a uniform 
distribution of potential offers, we show that if the local economy booms, causing the 
cost per search to fall as the arrival rate of offers increases, then the expected selling 
price of a property rises. Further, it rises by a greater amount the more atypical is the 
property.  
  We conclude that atypical properties’ price paths should differ from those of the 
market assuming there are intertemporal variations in market strength. Empirically, an 
interaction of a measure of changes in the strength of the housing market with the level 
of atypicality of a property should affect the rate of change in a property’s price relative 
to the market. The modified version of (7) used to test the hypotheses is: 
(8)  ∆Pi
* = (Xiδ’)∆MtT+ τAi∆MtT. 
 
Data   
  Our data are drawn from the 1989-1996 period in three metropolitan areas 
(Auckland, Christchurch, and Wellington) in New Zealand. The date of sale and property 
characteristics are recorded.
7 Our transaction based data set is limited to include only 
those houses where repeat sales are observed. The data source is the Real Estate 
  10Research Unit at the University of Auckland, who obtained it from Quotable Value Ltd. 
Deletions from the data set included properties that were not arm’s length transactions, 
properties with floor sizes less than 30 square meters or greater than 1,000 square 
meters, those that could be subdivided, properties with more than six parking spaces in 
the garage, condominiums, and properties with missing or changing characteristic 
values.
8
  The pattern of semi-annual real house price changes is displayed in Figures 1-3 
for the three areas. In Auckland and Wellington, real house prices trended downwards 
from 1989 to 1992, and then they rose through 1996. In Christchurch, real prices rose 
between 1989 and the first half of 1991, were stagnant until about the first half of 1993, 
and then trended upwards through the end of 1996. The range of increase in real prices 
over the period was from four percent in Wellington to 47 percent in Auckland.  
  Also displayed in the figures are time series indexes for real wages, total 
employment, and the number of housing transactions. These time series are used to 
measure the strength of the housing market, which is needed for the calculation of ∆MtT 
in (8). The product of real wages and employment is one measure of aggregate demand. 
The other measure is based on the insight of Berkovec and Goodman (1996), who argue 
that the turnover rate of existing houses is the best measure of housing market demand. 
Given that the stock of housing was relatively constant during our sample period, we use 
the number of sales per semi-annual period as a measure of turnover.  
  Real wages are relatively flat in each of the three markets, increasing between 
four and seven percent. Changes in employment appear to be a more important driver of 
price changes, with increases of between seven and 19 percent. The numbers of 
transactions appear to anticipate price changes in Auckland and Wellington, but the 
relationship is less clear in Christchurch. 
 [INSERT FIGURES 1-3] 
  11  The dependent variable in (8) is the difference between the percentage change 
in a property’s real value and the percentage change in the market average. The time 
period is determined by the sale dates of the property, and the market average is a 
constant-quality measure of real house price inflation.
9 Thus, we are explaining 
deviations in a particular house’s price change from the market’s movement within a 
metropolitan area. The choice of explanatory variables is guided by our theories, which 
suggest that house price characteristics, atypicality, and the strength of the housing 
market determine the price deviations. Variables’ means and standard deviations are 
reported in Table 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
  We have two measures of a property’s atypicality, one is an indicator of whether 
the property has a view of the ocean and the other is a measure of the aggregate value 
of deviation of a property’s characteristics from the sample mean. Because an ocean 
view is solely dependent on a property’s location and topography, it cannot be modified 
by the property owner and is thus a permanent measure of atypical properties. Also, it is 
relatively rare in the three localities being present in from two to 18 percent of 
observations.
10  Buyer and seller also could bargain over the value of an ocean view, 
and thus this variable plays two roles in the estimation. The implication is that the 
independent contributions of bargaining and atypicality cannot be identified for ocean 
views.  
  The second atypicality measure is created by first differencing a property’s and 
the market’s amount of each house characteristic. Then each difference is valued by the 
implicit price of that characteristic, derived from a hedonic price estimation. Then we 
sum the absolute values of the valuation of the differences. Atypical properties are thus 
characterized by those with unusual features.
11  
  12  The set of property characteristics that we include to test the hypotheses about 
bargaining includes land area, size of dwelling, age, distance to the central business 
district, distance to the nearest commercial subcenter (Auckland only), unusually poor or 
good condition of the exterior wall (“average” is the omitted category), and the number of 
garage parking spaces. Each of these variables is interacted with one of the measures 
of the change in market conditions.  
 
Empirical Results 
  Regressions of the form in (9) are estimated for each of the three localities:
12  
(9)  ∆Pi
* = a0 + (Xiδ’)∆MtT+ τAi∆MtT + εi. 
We report results in Table 2 for six variations on equation (9), two for each of the three 
cities.  One set of results for each city interacts the hedonic characteristics and 
atypicality measures with the first market strength measure, which is the percentage 
increase in employment multiplied by real wages.  The second set of results for each city 
uses the other market strength measure, which is the change in the number of 
transactions. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
  Age of the structure is consistently positive and significant across the six sets of 
results. Distance from the central business district and floor area are negative and 
significant in five of the estimations. The dummy variable indicating poor condition walls 
is positive and significant in four of the estimations, while that for good condition walls is 
negative and significant in three estimations. Distance from the nearest commercial 
subcenter is positive and significant in both of the Auckland equations (it is not relevant 
in the other cities). A property’s lot size is significant in four of the estimations, but has 
inconsistent signs. 
  13  These results suggest that in a strong market there is a premium with respect to 
the overall market for older, smaller, centrally-located properties that are in relatively 
poor condition; however, such properties sell at a discount in weak markets.  These 
properties may become more attractive in a rising market in part because renovation 
becomes economically more feasible.  Also, older and centrally-located properties are in 
relatively fixed supply, giving sellers more bargaining power in a strong market.  
However, the relative thinness of the markets for these characteristics means that sellers 
have less bargaining power in a weak market.  In contrast, newer and larger suburban 
properties in better condition tend to move at the market, most likely because they are in 
direct competition with newly constructed houses. 
  With respect to our two measures of atypicality, we obtain the same results when 
they are both included in the estimation as when they are entered separately (the latter 
results are not reported).  The ocean view variable is significant only in Christchurch and 
only when interacted with the first of the market strength variables.  This result could be 
due in part to the fact that ocean view is more atypical in Christchurch: two percent of 
properties in Christchurch have ocean views, compared with 11 and 18 percent in 
Auckland and Wellington, respectively.  Figure 3 suggests that the second market 
strength variable (number of transactions) is not a good measure in Christchurch, which 
probably explains why the interaction of that variable and ocean view is not significant 
for that city. 
  The second atypicality measure is significant in Wellington and Christchurch 
when interacted with the first market strength measure and in Auckland and Wellington 
when interacted with the second market strength measure.  It is not surprising that the 
atypicality variable interacted with the number of transactions does not work in 
Christchurch given our doubts about the accuracy of the second market strength 
variable for that city.  In contrast, we expect that the number of transactions may be a 
  14better indicator of market strength than changes in employment and wages in Auckland, 
given the impact of substantial immigration from Hong Kong and elsewhere in Asia.  In 
some cases, these immigrants entered the housing market but not the labor market.  
Overall, we find that our two measures of atypicality perform as expected.  The 
exceptions to this can be explained by differences in the degree of atypicality in the case 
of ocean views and differences across the three cities in the accuracy of the two 
measures of market strength. 
 
Conclusions 
Results from previous research indicate substantial variability in returns to 
particular properties relative to the market average. For example, the ratio of returns to 
the standard deviations of returns is 5.7 in Sweden (Englund, Hwang, and Quigley 2002) 
and is in the range of 1.5 to 3 for four U.S. metropolitan areas (Goetzmann 1993). We 
also find substantial variation in the ratio in three New Zealand areas, with the ratio 
ranging from 1.2 to 2.6. The goal of our paper is to explain these variations. 
Our theoretical model posits that if market conditions change then the 
characteristics of properties will affect the price path of a given property relative to the 
market. The model draws on two theories. First, the bargaining process between buyers 
and sellers on selected characteristics will change when market conditions are altered. 
In a strong market, houses with characteristics in limited supply will attract more buyers 
and hence the bargaining power of sellers will increase, leading prices of properties with 
these characteristics to rise at a faster rate than the market.  On the other hand, such 
properties will decline more than the market when economic conditions weaken.  
Second, greater price increases are expected for atypical properties in a strong market 
because the ratio of the expected sales price to the mean of the offer distribution will be 
relatively high for such properties. 
  15Our empirical analyses in a repeat-sales framework for three New Zealand cities 
confirm these hypotheses. In a strong market, smaller, older, centrally-located properties 
in relatively poor condition are increasingly appealing to investors and exhibit larger price 
increases than the market. Properties with such characteristics are in relatively limited 
supply, giving sellers more bargaining power in bullish markets. There also is general 
support for the atypicality hypothesis. The values of atypical homes rise at higher than 
average rates in strong markets, while the reverse holds in weak markets. 
The impact of property characteristics on returns has important implications for 
risk management. First, mortgage lenders should take property characteristics into 
account. For example, the risk that is borne when financing an atypical property is 
greater than when a standard house is financed. This also has implications for the 
stability of urban neighborhoods to the extent that houses with relevant characteristics 
tend to be concentrated in certain areas. Because houses in such neighborhoods 
experience exaggerated price cycles, relatively conservative underwriting standards may 
be warranted to avoid excessive concentrations of foreclosures and possible 
abandonment of houses when the market is weak. 
Second, given that housing is a large proportion of household portfolios, property 
idiosyncrasies can have a substantial impact on household wealth. Many households 
are probably aware that investing in an atypical or idiosyncratic house is riskier than 
purchasing a standard house. We provide strong evidence to confirm that conventional 
wisdom. Some authors have suggested that hedging instruments would be very useful in 
reducing risk in the housing sector. For example, Englund, Hwang, and Quigley (2002) 
consider short sales of securitized real estate for hedging housing risk, while Shiller 
(2003) discusses the usefulness of insurance contracts. Hedges, however, will be 
effective against market-wide price declines but not against any decline due to the 
  16idiosyncratic nature of a property. Any hedging device to cover idiosyncratic risk is likely 
to be too costly to market to property owners. 
  17 
Figure 1: Auckland—Real House Price Changes, Real Wages, Employment, and 
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  18Figure 2: Wellington—Real House Price Changes, Real Wages, Employment, and 
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Figure 3: Christchurch—Real House Price Changes, Real Wages, Employment, and 
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  20 Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Auckland  Wellington  Christchurch 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Real % Price Change    0.224    0.303    0.071    0.188    0.129    0.151 
Index % Price Change    0.184    0.211    0.026    0.092    0.102    0.104 
Lot Size    0.799    0.399    0.602    0.437    0.712    0.230 
Dist. CBD  12.068    6.599    5.396    3.587    5.176    2.424 
Dist. Subcenter    6.081    3.219     ---     ---     ---    --- 
Floor Area    0.137    0.054    0.137    0.052    0.127    0.045 
Age 34.390  23.432  49.558  27.742  43.301  24.621 
Garage Parking    1.420    0.740    1.005    0.792    1.509    0.671 
Wall-good    0.475    0.499    0.435    0.496    0.442    0.497 
Wall-poor    0.029    0.167    0.036    0.187    0.046    0.209 
Ocean View    0.107    0.309    0.180    0.384    0.021    0.144 
Atypicality    1.534    0.592    0.795    0.416    0.786    0.334 
Growth Change    0.110    0.104    0.068    0.080    0.073    0.068 
Transactions Change    0.426    0.773    0.039    0.062    0.064    0.235 
            
Sample size  15,776  2,086  11,086 
 
Notes: The descriptive statistics are for the underlying variables including the house 
characteristics and measures of housing market strength. The estimation is based on 
interactions of these variables. The real price change is property specific and measured 
between the first and second sales. Index is the real price change of the official house 
price index for the locality, measured for the same time periods. Distance to the CBD 
and primary subcenters is measured in thousands of meters. Lot size and house floor 
area are measured in thousands of square meters. Atypicality is measured in hundreds 
of thousands of dollars. Growth is the percentage change between sales in the product 
of the real wage in a locality and the number employed, divided by 100. The transactions 
variable is the change in the number of sales between sales, measured in thousands. 
 
  21Table 2 Panel A: Estimation of a House’s Price Increase Relative to the Market: The 
Change in Market Demand is Measured by the Change in the Product of Real Wages 
and Employment (M1) 
 
 Auckland  Wellington  Christchurch 
  Coefficient t value  Coefficient t value Coefficient  t value 
            
Intercept   0.058  23.64   0.048  10.93   0.038  19.27 
M1*Lot Size   0.305    9.22  -0.414    3.93   0.088    1.42 
M1*Dist. CBD  -0.033  18.30  -0.060    5.77  -0.050    9.21 
M1*Dist. Subcenter   0.013    3.78    ---    ---    ---   --- 
M1*Floor Area  -3.317  11.70  -2.377    2.84  -1.863    3.84 
M1*Age   0.016  26.60   0.013  13.62   0.010  18.75 
M1*Garage Parking  -0.113    6.37  -0.040    0.80  -0.157    6.94 
M1*Wall-good  -0.049    1.86  -0.154    2.16  -0.131    4.18 
M1*Wall-poor   0.574    7.19   0.590    3.26  -0.004    0.05 
M1*Ocean View   0.072    1.74   0.008    0.09   0.275    2.71 
M1*Atypicality   0.000    0.08   0.384    3.34   0.179    2.57 
            
Adjusted  R-squared  0.149 0.147 0.091 
Sample  size  15,776 2,086 11,086 
 
Panel B: Estimation of a House’s Price Increase Relative to the Market: The Change in 
Market Demand is Measured by the Change in the Number of Housing Transactions 
(M2) 
 
 Auckland  Wellington  Christchurch 
  Coefficient t value  Coefficient t value Coefficient  t value 
            
Intercept   0.033  16.46   0.045  10.99   0.018  12.40 
M2*Lot Size   0.017    3.22  -0.133    1.47   0.055    2.26 
M2*Dist. CBD  -0.007  23.47  -0.079    5.90   0.003    1.53  
M2*Dist. Subcenter   0.002    3.40    ---     ---    ---     --- 
M2*Floor Area  -0.128    2.68  -2.444    2.09   0.390    1.96 
M2*Age   0.002  20.49   0.013    9.68   0.002    9.26 
M2*Garage Parking  -0.012    3.99  -0.015    0.20  -0.008    0.85 
M2*Wall-good   0.000    0.06  -0.201    1.95  -0.008    0.58 
M2*Wall-poor   0.022    1.74   0.826    2.68   0.083    2.77 
M2*Ocean View   0.004    0.55  -0.090    0.70   0.037    0.89 
M2*Atypicality   0.024    4.79   0.446    2.78  -0.048    1.63 
            
Adjusted R-squared  0.116  0.082  0.058 
Sample  size  15,776 2,086 11,086 
 
  22Appendix: The Relationship between Expected Selling Price, the Cost of Search, 
and Atypicality in Repeat Sales Observations 
 
  We assume the seller of a property performs a sequential search for offers. The 
seller sets a reservation price ε equal to the maximum expected return on the sale of a 
house and considers each offer,  , in turn. If the offer exceeds the reservation price 
then it is accepted, otherwise it is rejected and the search continues (DeGroot 1970; 
McCall 1970; and Haurin 1988). There is no recall of offers, the offers are independent, 
and they have identical distribution functions, 
P
) (P φ . Further, the cost per offer cis 
constant over time. The net return from search for the n
th offer is Rn and Vn is the 
revenue earned from the n
th offer, given the value of the n
th offer is . Net returns are: 
. The expected value of net revenues, given n searches is: 
n P
cn V R n n − =
(A1)     ()() ERn EVn c n nn =− . 
  Because the offers are independent, the expected net return given n offers is 
maximized when n equals the expected number of offers received before the arrival of 
the first acceptable offer, N. Thus N equals the number of offers required for  ε ≥ n P . 
Rewriting (A1) yields: 
(A2)       cN N P E N R E N N − = ) | ( ) | (
The unconditional expectation of RN  is: 
] ) | ( [ )} | ( [ cN N P E E N R E E N N − = , 
which simplifies to:  
(A3)       ) ( ) ( ) ( N cE P E R E N N − =
  23where   is the expected value of the accepted offer and  ) ( N P E ( ) EN is the expected 
number of searches. In the general case, the probability density function of the 
























where  =  . Substituting equations (A4) into (A3) yields the 
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  A key question of this study is how the expected sales price (A4) changes 
between sales in times when the strength of the housing market changes. Changes in 
the market can be characterized by changes in the arrival rate per unit time or, 
equivalently, the cost per search,  . Thus, the derivative of   with respect to 
reflects the effect of changes in market conditions on the expected sales price. The 
sensitivity of this effect to the atypicality of a property is found by evaluating  
 where σ
c ) ( N P E
c
σ ∂ ∂ ∂ c P E N / ) (
2 2 is the variance of the offer distribution. 




 on the range of [0, b]. From (A6) the 
reservation price is: 
(A7)  ε =− bb 2 c . 
The expected sales price from (A4) is: 











P E N . 
Increasing the cost per search reduces both the reservation price and the expected 
sales price: 
(A9)  0































  The above results show that if the local economy booms causing the cost per 
search to fall as the arrival rate of offers increases, then the expected selling price of a 
property rises if the distribution of offers is uniform. Further, it rises by a greater amount 
the more atypical the property. The effect in (A9) is relatively large; however, that in 
(A10) is clearly smaller.  
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  31Footnotes 
                                                 
1 See Dietz and Haurin (2003) for a summary of the evidence for each view. 
2 This survey contains sufficient information to identify the characteristics of the seller 
and buyer of a property. 
3 They note that a shift in the constant changes the hedonic surface without affecting 
attributes’ implicit prices. 
4 This prediction is somewhat borne out by Capozza, Israelsen, and Thomson’s (2005) 
finding that atypical repossessed houses tend to sell for less relative to their original 
price than do standard houses.  
5 This assumption can be enforced by limiting the sample to properties with unchanging 
characteristics. The exception is a characteristic such as the age of the property, which 
can be directly controlled. 
6 Market-wide shifts in the price of all properties due to changes in the relative bargaining 
strength of the seller and potential buyer will be reflected in the market rate of house 
price change. 
7 Often repeat sales data sets contain only information about house prices and not 
house characteristics, the primary example being the OFHEO data based on Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae underwriting. Thus, these data sets cannot be used to explore the 
relationship between house type and price changes. 
8 The exception is that the measure of house age varies over time. 
9 We use the official house price indexes which are described in more detail in Bourassa, 
Hoesli, and Sun (2004a). 
10 Its contribution to the price of properties is documented in Bourassa, Hoesli, and Sun 
(2004b). 
  32                                                                                                                                                 
11 This measure of atypicality was used by Haurin (1988) and Capozza, Israelsen, and 
Thomson (2005). 
12 An intercept is included to capture the difference in the mean appreciation rate of the 
sample of repeat sales properties from that of the official index. Thus the dependent 
variable does not have a zero mean as the values are slightly positive in the three areas. 
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